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Abstract 
Why do freshman representatives in Congress seem to have lower legislative activity than their peers? 
Once the effects causing their lowered levels of success are determined, can these differences be used to 
advise those members on how they might pass more legislation in their first, least electorally secure, 
term? In this thesis I attempt to answer those two questions, by analyzing replication data from Volden 
and Wiseman’s Legislative Effectiveness in Congress (2009). I portend that the electoral margin of a 
candidate negatively affects their legislative effectiveness, both because they are under less reelection 
pressure, and they might come from more easily won, less respected districts. I find that this hypothesis is 
supported by the data, though only slightly. Further research in this area may uncover greater effects that 
further explain freshman legislative effectiveness. 
Introduction 
The careers of representatives often start slowly, yet their continued re-election often 
depends upon the ability to demonstrate significant legislative success1 in the U.S. Congress. 
New representatives often start their term enthusiastically, eager to turn their platform into law 
because their chances for reelection are strengthened when they can demonstrate a strong 
legislative term. At least, if we are to assume an electoral aspiration from most freshman 
congressmen, Mayhew’s accountability relationships would have us believe that legislative 
activity most actively creates accountability (Mayhew 1974, 6).  Unfortunately, passing a bill 
through committee, the floor of the House, and then the Senate, is a complicated and intricate 
process not possible for many new representatives. Initial accomplishment may exist only at the 
level of sponsoring a bill and having it considered in Committee. Although some freshmen do 
                                                            
1 This term is used interchangeably with several others (Hasecke and Mycoffe 2007, 609). Other synonymous terms  
include legislative productivity (Cox and Terry 2008) and legislative effectiveness (Jeydel and Taylor 2013; Volden 
and Wiseman 2009). This Thesis will use the most appropriate for the situation, but assume their usage is relatively 
interchangeable. 
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pass legislation by themselves, rarely do they match, let alone surpass, the levels of legislative 
effectiveness of more tenured representatives. This analysis offers possible insight into 
legislative strategy because more legislatively successful freshmen might have greater chances of 
continued careers in the House of Representatives. If the chain of causality runs in that direction, 
placing a greater or lesser emphasis on one’s legislative agenda may increase or decrease their 
chances at reelection. In these findings there may be a selection bias, in that there may be a 
fundamental difference in electoral capability between members with high levels of legislative 
effectiveness. The factors allowing for this success remain unexplained. This thesis will 
incorporate new theories and developments in the study of legislative effectiveness, and use 
these developments to explain the different levels of legislative effectiveness among freshman 
representatives. As the primary focus, the potential relationship between electoral success and 
legislative effectiveness among freshman representatives will show how electoral performance 
may predict success as a legislator. 
Many studies have measured the successes of representatives (Anderson, Box-
Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Cox and Terry 2008; Frantzich 1979), and attempted 
to explain the factors involved in becoming a successful legislator, but few studies focus on new 
members. This is an important perspective, as new members represent the most recent changes in 
electoral politics, and the future of the House of Representatives. Previous studies of legislative 
effectiveness present models for understanding the factors contributing to greater levels of 
success, but these factors remain untested for freshman representatives. A comprehensive 
explanation of what makes a freshman representative successful holds great implications for the 
study of legislative effectiveness. 
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This analysis thesis will follow a two stage process. First, a review of the literature 
explaining the dynamics of a representative’s first term in the house will provide a starting model 
for understanding legislative effectiveness. Next, this thesis will attempt to quantitatively 
replicate the conclusion found in Volden and Wiseman’s preliminary study that freshmen 
representatives are less legislatively successful than more senior members (2009). This thesis 
then replicates their conclusions, and proposes a model for explaining different levels of 
legislative effectiveness among freshman representatives. 
 
Previous Research and Literature Review 
Legislative effectiveness 
Legislative effectiveness, success, and productivity all vary in measurement and 
definition across political studies. Most scholars agree that greater levels of success on the floor 
demonstrate greater political might, and that the study of legislative effectiveness provides 
insight into how congressional hierarchies operate. Hasecke and Mycoff describe legislative 
success as, “The ability to advance bills sponsored by the member through the legislative 
process” (Hasecke and Mycoffe 2007, 609). This approach operationalizes itself, through 
counting the number of bills passed by a congressman in a Congressional term. Other methods of 
operationalization remain. As Anderson et al. propose, “An equally important contribution is our 
conceptualization of the dependent variable…as a count of the number of bills by a member that 
move through the legislative process rather than the proportion of the bills enacted” (Anderson, 
Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003, 358). This approach covers the process of 
legislation, rather than purely the result, because bills that make it partially through the 
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legislative process may still demonstrate some legislative effectiveness. Among freshmen, this 
form of operationalization will help distinguish between lower levels of success.  
These two approaches are consolidated and expanded by Volden and Wiseman, who 
created another measurement for legislative effectiveness—a Legislative Effectiveness Score 
(LES). This approach includes, “How many bills each legislator introduced, and how many of 
those bills receive action in committee, pass out of committee…, pass the house, and ultimately 
become law” (Volden and Wiseman 2009, 10). Using econometric models, sequentially higher 
weights (1, 5, and 10) are placed on a bill’s progression through the legislative process2. Volden 
and Wiseman found that LESs may better describe the legislative effectiveness of a 
representative or senator than previous methods (Volden and Wiseman 2009). This is because 
the entire process of legislation is given weight, and unpassed bills still count towards a 
legislator’s effectiveness. Therefore, members who propose some legislation are coded higher 
than those who are completely inactive, an important consideration when isolating a particularly 
unsuccessful portion of the House. Also, since the quantity attained from a single bill is no 
longer binary, differentiation between bill progress levels becomes possible. This is useful for 
describing the ineffective freshman, as every single bill will provide more information than the 
binary methods.  
Isolating Freshmen 
Although past studies have explored legislative effectiveness, few have isolated freshman 
representatives as a population worth studying. Hibbing discusses the process of apprenticeship, 
coming to two conclusions. First, he submits that freshmen in the 1980s have lowered levels of 
                                                            
2 For a complete explanation of how legislative effectiveness is calculated, see pgs. 12-13 of (Volden and Wiseman 
2009) 
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allegiance to a legislative agenda, because they viewed their role as an apprentice and first-term 
incumbent. Secondly,  he argues freshmen have fewer opportunities to participate in legislation 
because of a newfound prioritization for omnibus bills, as well as procedural reforms that 
discourage freshman participation (Hibbing 1991, 117). Since the late 1980s, when Hibbing 
conducted his studies, the dynamics of representation may have changed. Nonetheless, he 
discourages isolating freshman representatives as a group unto themselves. He argues that the 
congressional representative is best analyzed using her career, not each of her terms, “The 
preferred approach is to view careers as continuous rather than consisting of only two parts. As 
such classes should be observed across their congressional careers” (Hibbing 1991, 117). I 
believe this exclusion neglects the significance of particular events in that term. Furthermore, 
important effects unique to freshmen representatives may exist independently from career 
effects. Important bills, whether passed or stalled in committee, may form and describe the entire 
career of a representative. Hibbing’s dismissal is also founded in the inability to distinguish the 
sponsorship of omnibus bills from free riders or other non-substantive bills. This thesis, though 
perhaps ignoring the career effects of representatives, will attempt to describe a member’s first 
two years as a member of Congress, and the effects controlling her legislative effectiveness 
during that time.  
Volden and Wiseman do analyze freshmen as a unique subset in their analyses, though 
they mostly focus on freshmen effects in relation to later performance levels. They conclude that 
highly successful freshmen representatives both continue to be highly successful legislators, but 
also that they are more likely to pursue higher office, and not voluntarily retire after their first or 
other early terms (Volden and Wiseman 2009, 20). Furthermore, they assert that their analysis 
runs parallel to and supports Mayhew’s claim that legislative effectiveness may be a predictor for 
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higher office (Mayhew 1991). Volden and Wiseman also demonstrate the legislative significance 
of extended careers in the house,  
“With that in mind, it is interesting to note that freshman members of Congress 
have an average LES of 0.385, while sophomores average 0.551. Members in 
their fifth term demonstrate an effectiveness level of 0.973, while those with ten 
or more terms of congressional service average 2.17” (Volden and Wiseman 
2009, 21)  
 
Data Organization and Methodology 
The first distinction in the study of legislative effectiveness resides in the choice between 
units of analysis. Political scientists must decide between bill-level data and member-level data 
when exploring the dynamics of legislative success quantitatively. Bill-level analysis illustrates 
most effectively the qualities of bills through the committee process. Information regarding the 
sponsor, cosponsor(s), topic, seniority, legislative activity, and relevant dates readily enter into 
the analysis, because information from each bill is recorded within these parameters (Adler and 
Wilkerson 2012, 132). Alternatively, member-level analysis collects the biographical 
information of those studied, and centralizes that information to the member, or member-term if 
applicable. A study using member-level data may involve a member’s legislative history or 
electoral experience. Volden and Wiseman, using data from members of Congress, showed the 
career paths of freshman congressmen amongst varying levels of legislative effectiveness 
(Volden and Wiseman 2009). This thesis will focus on member-level analysis because the 
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biographical information related to each representative will help explain their individual 
legislative effectiveness. 
Alternatives 
Other methods considered for measuring the legislative effectiveness of legislators have 
been explored in the past. Individual effectiveness has been measured by conducting surveys of 
state legislators. They report their effectiveness and biographical characteristics individually and 
of their peers, allowing a novel way for measuring the details of legislative processes (Sue 2005). 
This approach is less appropriate for the Federal level, as standing members of the United States 
Congress do not receive these surveys. Also, there is doubt in the accuracy of self-reported 
legislative efficacy, so studies often resort to bill-level passage rates among the state legislatures 
(Bratton and Haynie 1999). 
Activity level 
Political scientists have explored the various independent variables associated with 
legislative effectiveness. They have found that several relationships constitute much of the 
variance in legislative effectiveness. As argued by Anderson et al., “A member’s activity level 
encourages legislative success, but gains are limited when members speak or sponsor too 
frequently” (Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003, 357). This would 
suggest that, to a point, members who give speeches and sponsor bills achieve greater levels of 
legislative success.  
 
 
Osnes  
8 
 
Institutional Factors 
Volden and Wiseman summarize the various other independent variables affecting 
legislative effectiveness. They conclude that the factors involved are, “Innate ability, the 
acquisition and cultivation of a critical skill set, and the sophisticated utilization of key 
legislative institutions” (Volden and Wiseman 2009, 7). Innate ability, though difficult to 
quantify, could explain the remaining differences in legislative effectiveness. A “cultivation of a 
critical skill set” could be construed as legislative professionalism, or previous state legislative 
experience in a highly professionalized legislature. The “sophisticated utilization of key 
legislative institutions” evades simple definition. Seniority and committee membership constitute 
a portion of legislative sophistication, but there remains a latent ability for a legislator to achieve 
goals within her institution. This study, among others, seeks to explain a portion of that ability.  
Electoral margin 
Electoral result is quantified by Volden and Wiseman as the percentage of the two-party 
vote acquired to win the election (2009, 44). They square the number, as well, in order to explain 
different relationships than linear. They justify the operation as follows, 
“Vote Share and its square are included to allow for the possibility that members 
from safe seats can dedicate greater time and effort to internal legislative 
effectiveness rather than external electioneering and to allow this effect to be 
nonlinear.”  (2013, 331) 
Political scientists have incorporated other variables into their analysis while attempting 
to derive legislative success. Financial contributions and fundraising power, although difficult to 
ascertain, may provide insight into what a freshman legislator has to offer. Hasecke and Mycoff 
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posit, “members can demonstrate party loyalty through floor voting and financial contributions 
to the party’s re-election efforts…the evidence shows that both…have a significant effect on 
legislative success” (Hasecke and Mycoffe 2007, 608). Party loyalty, as quantified through floor 
voting and financial contributions, offer new hypotheses for this study, as some freshman 
legislators might have greater financial influence than others. If this were the case, the possibility 
that greater party loyalty attained through financial contributions or floor voting becomes 
important to predicting legislative effectiveness among freshman legislators. Greater levels of 
financial contributions should, then, improve a member’s LES. Financial contributions are both 
difficult to identify and difficult to compare, however. Hasecke and Mycoffe tackle the problem 
of comparison by gathering Z-scores, indicating the deviation each member has from her 
Congress’s mean (Hasecke and Mycoffe 2007, 612). This approach describes each member’s 
contribution, and the temporal significance that contribution had. 
Another subsection in the study of legislative effectiveness concerns the Senate. Similar 
effects, especially career-based effects, may both explain the legislative process of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. Matthews qualitatively categorizes the role of senators, and 
thereby the expected level of legislative activity, in their first term as an “unobtrusive 
apprenticeship” (Matthews 1959, 1065). He continues; “The freshman senator’s subordinate 
status is impressed upon him in many ways,” and further describes how freshmen are 
discouraged from occupying legislative space (Matthews 1959, 1065). This trend is well-
recognized among senators, and there is a possibility it continues to representatives. This might 
help explain the likelihood that freshmen are less legislatively successful than more senior 
members.  
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Legislative experience for freshman representatives is often restricted to state legislative 
experience, as few representatives, if any, have experience in the Senate. State legislatures often 
vary in intensity and involvement, so measures of professionalism have been developed in order 
to explain the nature of experience a representative might bring to her seat. Squire creates a 
measure of legislative professionalization, and describes how a state legislature might be more or 
less professionally organized. Salary, number of staff, and time in session vary among the 
legislatures, and describe how professional they are (Squire 1992, 2007). This thesis will 
incorporate and compare legislative professionalization and legislative experience. Legislators 
with equal levels of experience might still vary in their legislative effectiveness because of how 
professional their position was. In an effort to address this possibility, Volden and Wiseman 
incorporated an interaction effect, able to incorporate the possibility that more professional 
experience might affect legislative effectiveness differently than less professional experience 
(Volden and Wiseman 2009, 24).  
Significance 
The study of freshmen representatives is capable of describing, before other approaches, 
the trends present over the coming Congressional session. In essence, it seems the characteristics 
of the freshman class predict the behavior for the next generation of representatives. In Richard 
Fenno’s Learning to Govern, interviews of freshman congressman evoke this predictability. 
They claim, “The freshman class is the best representation of an absolute commitment to 
change” (Richard F. Fenno 1997, 24). This idealistic viewpoint shows that members often 
believe they carry an electoral incentive. Their first election more directly demonstrates a will of 
the people, and therefore they command greater legislative power than would be granted given a 
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linear assignment from seniority. This confidence rarely coincides with real activity on the floor, 
but freshmen representatives often begin their terms with beguiled enthusiasm. 
Hypotheses 
Several explanations applicable to freshman representatives for different levels of 
legislative effectiveness are present in the literature. Some, including leadership positions and 
seniority, are not applicable, and must elude this study because freshmen rarely or never attain 
leadership positions and they do not vary amongst levels of seniority.  
This thesis is primarily focused on the relationship between electoral performance and 
legislative success. Electoral performance will be quantified as the number of standard 
deviations from the congressional mean a representative receives. Higher numbers denote a 
greater share than the congressional mean, though all freshman representatives are often 
significantly below this average, as incumbents often enjoy larger victory margins. It seems 
freshmen that win a larger margin might represent a district that will be more likely elect her in 
the future. At the very least, freshmen who are elected by large margins are more likely to 
believe that their seats are safe. Representative seats, although periodically unstable, often elect 
incumbents that won by large margins previously. Therefore, representatives that win smaller 
margins will feel pressure to strengthen their position for the next election. If this is the case, we 
might expect freshmen representatives to force their legislative agenda and appear as frequently 
as possible as sponsors of substantive bills. Therefore the central hypothesis tying these two 
variables together is; with greater vote margins, come lower levels of legislative effectiveness.  
There are numerous controls that will help isolate the effects of electoral margin on 
legislative effectiveness. Volden and Wiseman, in their introduction of the LES system, 
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introduced many of the controls used in this experiment. A few are unusable or unsuitable to this 
study, as they require a history of legislative work in the case of a lagged LES, or impossibly-
high levels of congressional positioning, in the case of the Speaker of the House. 
Majority party membership, however, is anticipated to be important for a new 
representative’s legislative success. Representatives with agendas similar to their party are often 
given more opportunities in the passage of legislation. Thus, membership in the majority party 
should increase the legislative effectiveness of all representatives, regardless of seniority. 
Minority party members have difficulty passing legislation even when highly tenured, so 
freshman minority legislators should be disadvantaged as well. Each Congressional term may 
exert some force on the legislative effectiveness of the floor, as the entire body of representatives 
may be more or less gridlocked, or more or less competitive. Some trends elicited without 
congressional term may become nullified with its inclusion, because legislative effectiveness 
may be caused by different factors throughout the history of the United States House of 
Representatives. The LES  already contains a consideration for Congressional term, as the 
average score for each term is set to 1. This allotment falls apart when isolating freshmen, 
however, so a dummy variable will be included for a baseline Congress (93rd), and the effect of 
each succeeding congress. These numbers will not be reported in the final regression table, but 
are available in a Stata .do replication file and will be provided upon request.  
Legislators who occupy powerful positions in Congress are in a position to sponsor and 
promote legislation more effectively, both because their position attains a higher level of 
legislative influence and because they have more bargaining power. Few freshman 
representatives ever make it to these seats in their first term, but the variable’s inclusion might 
control for small effect sizes from the few members that do attain these positions. From the 93rd 
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Congress to the 110th Congress, fewer than 5% of freshman representatives occupied this seat—a 
total of 60. Those members might have higher or lower levels of legislative effectiveness, and 
this variable’s inclusion will control for the possibility that their authority changes their 
legislative effectiveness.  
State Professionalism is quantified using a scale developed by Squire as a coordinated 
index measure for how professional a State legislative seat is (Squire 1992). There is a body of 
literature focused on determining the effects of highly professionalized seats. The career 
prospects of the seat improve when salaries, staff, and higher numbers of calendar days become 
available. The body of research surrounding state legislative professionalism suggests that with 
more professional state legislative experience come greater levels of legislative effectiveness. 
Research Design and Methodology 
The dataset studied is a collection of House members from the 93rd (January 3rd, 1973) to 
the 110th (January 3rd, 2009) Congresses. The unit of observation is Member/Terms. Some 
members are voted out of office after their first term, so they only have one entry, while others, 
like John Dingell, remain in office more than 55 years (He retired after the dataset’s final 
Congress, and started before the first). In the regression of Freshman Representatives he will not 
even be counted as his first term predates the 93rd Congress. The data source is replication data 
from Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer’s study titled, “When are Women More Effective 
Lawmakers Than Men?” available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse 
(Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013)3. 
The dependent variable, legislative effectiveness, will be measured using Volden, 
Wiseman, and Wittmer’s LES (Legislative Effectiveness Score). Independent variables, 
                                                            
3 http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/ajps/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/18911 
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including majority party membership, party membership, state legislative experience, and state 
legislative professionalism are useful controls that are readily available to this study. The 
primary independent variable of interest, the deviation from the average vote percentage each 
congressman receives per term, is quantified as a Z score deviation from each Congress’s mean. 
This variable might behave differently as a Z score deviation from each other freshman’s mean, 
so that variant coding will be included in the final model as well. The crucial difference between 
the two variable’s coding is whether the entire body of elections is considered, or just the 
elections of members attaining their first term. The average vote share for freshmen is lower than 
the average vote share for the entire body of representatives, thus replicating the findings of 
Volden and Wiseman. 
Data Analysis 
 For this thesis, two overarching models will show the legislative effectiveness of each 
member of the House of Representatives as a whole, and then the specific legislative 
effectiveness of freshman legislators. First, a regression model will determine the extent to which 
freshmen have lower levels of legislative effectiveness. Then, amongst freshmen, the causes of 
different levels of legislative effectiveness will be studied. A discussion of trends will follow, but 
some immediate trends become apparent. 
(See Tables 1 & 2) 
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Discussion 
 There are few initial confessions and admissions necessary to review in order to assess 
the scope of these findings. First, LES is an interval variable that behaves different than most. 
One important consideration is that it has no maximum limit, but the vast majority of cases 
reside in the first four points (See figure 1). In fact, the 95th percent most effective legislator 
(across all seniority levels) received a 3.88 score for legislative effectiveness from the 93rd to the 
100th Congress’s. The average freshman received a .365 score, so even seemingly-small effect 
sizes have large significances. The jump from the bottom quartile to the top quartile of legislative 
effectiveness only involves an increase of .41, so the coefficient on Majority already approaches 
the bump necessary to become a successful legislator from an unsuccessful legislator.  
 Majority, Democrat, Power Seat, Chair, and State Legislative Experience are all 
dichotomous variables, so their effects do not surpass their coefficients. Vote Deviation from 
Congress and Vote Deviation from Freshmen are variables associated with standard deviations, 
so they can range, reasonably, several points from negative to positive changing the magnitude to 
beyond .15, possibly. State Legislative Experience * Professionalism is a variable that ranges 
from zero to one, so its coefficient also represents the total effect size from minimum to 
maximum, even though the variable’s distributional range is only zero to .659. Therefore, the 
magnitude is actually smaller than the listed coefficient. Also worthy of mention is that the N 
value is higher for Table 1 than for Table 2 because the first regression does not limit the 
population to freshman legislators. The N value for the first model in Table 2 is larger than the 
next two models because the inclusion of vote margin eliminates special elections that caused 
missing vote data, be it because of appointments or uncontested races.  
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 Volden and Wiseman incorporated several additional variables, and attained significantly 
higher adjusted R squared values (Volden and Wiseman 2009, 42). Upon review of the 
replication materials provided in their paper, some variables seemed to account for vastly larger 
portions of this than others. This experiment is unable to include several of the most explanatory 
variables from their study, however, so the R squared values suffered. Most notably, the Lagged 
LES variable requires at least one previous term’s information, so freshmen have no values in 
that category. Further models incorporating campaign finance information, career experience, or 
district history may help alleviate this deficiency, as the knowledge of historical performance 
seems to be very predictive of success in the larger House. Regardless of these omissions, a few 
remaining emergent trends are worth exploring. 
 First, it seems indisputable that freshman legislators attain significantly lower levels of 
legislative effectiveness than their more senior colleagues. If we remember that an increase of 
.41 represents the change from bottom to top quartile performance of legislative effectiveness, 
then the coefficient of -.623 should show just how integral an effect being a freshman really is on 
one’s legislative effectiveness—surpassing even the difference between comparatively 
successful and unsuccessful. The effect size is also significant, since the only effects exceeding 
that of freshman status are majority status and chairing a committee. It is also evident from the 
table that the effect of being a freshman is negative, and significant enough to try to explain in a 
further analysis. The average reelected congressman attains a slightly higher-than-average LES, 
at 1.12. A cut of .62 demonstrates that their legislative effectiveness is severely hampered by the 
freshman level of seniority, and that their average legislative effectiveness can be expected to go 
from below average to above average, just simply by being reelected.  
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 The next analysis attempts to provide explanatory variables for freshman legislative 
effectiveness, and to some extent succeeds in doing so. There still are strong effect sizes from 
majority, democrat, and chair variables, though. Majority party advantage for legislative 
effectiveness is anticipated, as there are significant procedural and logistic advantages to being a 
member of the controlling party. For the encoding of LES as a dependent variable, the 
coefficient in front of each of these can represent the difference between a successful first term 
and a failed one. 
 The three models reflect different ways of looking at freshman legislative effectiveness. 
First, the model without the vote margin is included to demonstrate the explanatory power of my 
model with the inclusion of vote margin. The second model’s adjusted R squared values do 
increase, but only by a little less than 2%. Of course we must remember that the inclusion of any 
new variable in a model increases the explanatory power of that model, so I included an adjusted 
R square value to account for this. This model does suffer from low R squared values, but I 
submit that this is because the data analyzed do not yet describe all the pertinent information in 
predicting legislative effectiveness. As this thesis simply attempts to submit a useful model for 
describing legislative effectiveness of freshman representatives, further models may provide 
greater explanatory power. The incorporation of campaign finance data, party history, or district 
history may greatly improve this model and others to follow.  
 The differences between the second and third model are small, but pertinent. Vote 
deviation from Congress shows how the electoral percentage of the individual member differs 
from her entire Congress’s average. This number will determine to what extent the freshman 
representative has higher or lower vote margins than his entire collection of peers. The vote 
deviation from freshman variable shows the differences from each representative’s cohort. The 
Osnes  
18 
 
practical difference between these quantifications is that congressional vote margins seem to 
stabilize after longer tenures, while freshman vote margins might be more affected by short term 
effects. The two coefficients do not seem sufficiently distinct, at least when the error terms are 
considered, so the results are fundamentally the same for both variables. Both are statistically 
significant, but not sufficiently distinguishable from each other.  
 The hypotheses suggested by this thesis have been affirmed. First and foremost, it seems 
evident that freshmen representatives who receive higher percentages of the vote attain lower 
levels of legislative effectiveness than members who receive smaller portions of the vote. As 
stated before, this effect can be taken to mean that representatives who feel their districts are 
more jeopardized will fight harder for legislative attention. However, this trend might also be 
explained by an endogenous effect. Members who have large vote margins might have run with 
the express knowledge that their district would be easy to win. If this is the case, members with 
lower legislative ambition might seek the position, when more competitive districts will weed 
these candidates out. An inclusion of party history for the district, specifically the tendency for 
members of the representative’s party to have won in the past, might help clarify between these 
explanations. This is because districts with stronger party histories that have just suffered a low 
return might show that the recent election is more competitive than previous ones have been, and 
strong party histories that have just garnered another strong victory might show less competitive 
elections. Another useful variable to try to include might be a summary of campaign 
contributions and campaign spending. Districts that ran more expensive campaigns, but attained 
the same vote margin for the winning party as less expensively-campaigned districts, might have 
more competitive elections. Conversely, districts with low levels of campaign spending and high 
vote margins might have severe partisan leanings, or a history of low competitiveness.  
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Conclusion 
 This thesis works to explain the legislative effectiveness of freshman representatives. As 
their average levels of success are often quite a bit lower than their peers, an initial attempt at 
describing different levels of success among freshmen might yield insight into how freshmen 
may increase their legislative effectiveness. This thesis proposes that increasing electoral 
margins have a negative effect on legislative effectiveness. The acting theory is that greater vote 
shares may demonstrate less competitive elections, and reduce the incentive a representative has 
to pass as much constituent-serving legislation. Conversely, representatives who received smaller 
portions of the vote might seek legislative titles and sponsorships in an attempt to solidify their 
reputation as an important member of the House.  
 Previous research has neglected to isolate freshmen, and has instead focused on career 
effects, and general seniority. Many important effects are present across the career of a 
congressman, such as increasing legislative freedom and seat security, but uncovered effects 
remain in the first term of a representative. This thesis compares freshmen with the body of 
Congress as a whole, and replicates the conclusions of past research that freshmen are less 
legislatively successful than more tenured colleagues. It then explores the nature of this disparity, 
and concludes that some presupposed hypotheses are supported, such as majority party status and 
chairing a committee having a positive effect on legislative effectiveness. The next variable of 
interest, percentage of vote share, follows a significant negative correlation that suggests a slight 
disadvantage, legislatively, in garnering larger percentages of the vote share. There are a few 
notable complications, however. The adjusted r squared value increases by less than .02 out of a 
total .25, which means there are many remaining influences upon legislative effectiveness, even 
if much is left to random error. Also, the magnitude of the variable seems to be smaller than 
Osnes  
20 
 
others, a total of .159 for three different standard errors4. This would have greater significance 
among the lowest achieving members, as the LES scores are not normally distributed (see figure 
1).  
Nonetheless, the data do support this central claim; with each standard deviation5 below the 
average entering freshman’s vote margin, representatives are .042 LES points higher6. 
Furthermore, there are distinguishable differences in legislative effectiveness with differences 
between vote shares in as little as one standard deviation, in the case of -1 to 0 (see figure 2). 
This shows that, if nothing else, the more successful freshman legislators have lower vote shares 
than those who have average vote shares. The confidence intervals do start to expand 
significantly past the average vote share of about -.7. This shows that either fewer observations 
exist in the high vote share zones, or legislative effectiveness is less predictable among members 
who received high vote percentages than low vote percentages, or both.  
A few other final aspects of this study worth mention are the controls. Legislative 
effectiveness among freshman representatives is not explained much at all by previous legislative 
experience. This is surprising, as many have theorized that experience in state legislatures may 
help the freshman representative grow accustomed to the intricacies of legislative work more 
quickly. Approximately half did have such experience, while the other half did not. There were 
negative effects when the entire Congress’s state legislative experience was considered. This is 
also surprising, but not the subject of this thesis. Majority party membership, as expected, had an 
overwhelmingly positive effect on legislative effectiveness. The specific party mattered 
significantly as well, though this might be due to historical trends present in the data (Democrats 
                                                            
4 The Coefficient of Vote Deviation from Congress (.053) * 3 
5 A useful benchmark for evaluating standard deviations of vote margin is 1 stdev ≈ 10 percentage points 
6 For context, this is the approximate difference between the following percentiles: 0-16, 34-45, 71-72, etc.  
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and Republicans were not in power for equal periods of time in the 93rd to 110th Congresses. 
Thus, timed effects might persist even when controlling for party).  
The complications and reservations inherent in this analysis might be addressed by more 
intricate and nuanced research. The present analysis has several problems that may be fixed in 
later studies. First, vote share is only a measure of the vote received by the individual member in 
their election. Theoretically, it does not describe the overall competitiveness of the election, the 
support they received from their national party, the number of challengers, or the extent to which 
they were challenged in the primary. Any inclusion of these considerations would greatly 
improve the analysis, and may alter the conclusion of this thesis. A few questions arise as well, 
and they may be answered by further analysis. First, do these trends continue into historic 
Congresses? Also, is variance in vote share present due to competitiveness of the election, lack 
of a quality challenger, or the political clout of each candidate? Also, are there controlling factors 
that may eliminate this variance? There is actually significant possibility that the relationship 
between legislative effectiveness and vote share is controlled for by a third variable, but a 
legitimate effort at isolating variance in legislative effectiveness did not yield a source. Further 
research may do so.  
 Though this analysis proposes more questions than it answers, freshman representatives 
are less legislatively successful, and that those who received high vote shares are even less 
legislatively successful. A liberal application of this finding would cause us to value the 
competitive election—perhaps they draw more legislatively effective candidates, or they push 
each representative to write more laws due to an electoral incentive. Also, members who fight 
for margins past reasonably-certain victory may view the House as a position to be secured, 
rather than continually earned. A representative should be representative continually, and they 
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should pass bills regardless of their electoral safety. If secure spots assure that a representative 
may “coast by”, then we should seek to challenge the spots of those members, in an attempt to 
maximize our legislative process. Then again, greater quantities of legislation do not signify 
higher qualities of legislation, so perhaps these claims are misaligned. Regardless, we now have 
more information on how and why freshman legislators pass legislation in their first term than 
before. 
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Appendix 
Freshman Effect on Legislative Effectiveness 
Freshman -0.623*** (0.041) 
State Legislative Experience -0.102** (0.051) 
State Legislative Experience * 
Professionalism 
0.457*** 
(0.143) 
Female -0.014 (0.052) 
Distance from Floor Median -0.060 (0.084) 
Power Seat -0.257*** (0.034) 
Chair Seat 3.546*** (0.068) 
Majority Party 0.806*** (0.040) 
Democrat -0.104*** (0.031) 
Constant 0.593*** (0.052) 
N 7851 
Adjusted R2 .369 
* p < 0.1 (two-tailed), ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. 
 
    Table 1 Freshman Effectiveness 
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Determinants of Freshmen Legislative Effectiveness 
Model Variant (1) (2) (3) 
Vote Deviation from Congress  0.053*** (0.019)  
Vote Deviation from Freshmen   0.042*** (0.014) 
Majority 0.299*** (0.031) 
0.316*** 
(0.033) 
0.316*** 
(0.033) 
Democrat 0.139*** (0.030) 
0.105*** 
(0.033) 
0.105*** 
(0.033) 
Power Seat 0.003 (0.063) 
-0.002 
(0.065) 
-0.006 
(0.065) 
Chair 6.299*** (0.469) 
6.311*** 
(0.469) 
6.312*** 
(0.469) 
State Legislative Experience -0.009 (0.044) 
-0.026 
(0.047) 
-0.026 
(0.047) 
State Legislative Experience * 
Professionalism 
-0.031 
(0.128) 
0.063 
(0.139) 
0.068 
(0.139) 
Constant 0.246*** (0.055) 
0.209*** 
(0.060) 
0.243*** 
(0.058) 
N 1274 1155 1155 
Adjusted R2 .238 .251 .251 
* p < 0.1 (two-tailed), ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. 
    
Table 2 Legisative Effectiveness of Freshmen 
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 Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Whole House Freshmen
P
er
ce
nt
Legislative Effectiveness Score (1-5-10)
Observations Exceeding 3 Omitted
Legislative Effectiveness Distribution 93rd-110th
Average Vote Share = -.713
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
P
re
di
ct
ed
 L
eg
is
la
tiv
e 
E
ffe
ct
iv
ne
ss
 S
co
re
-2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Deviations from Average Vote Share
95% CI Fitted values
Legislative Effectiveness of Freshmen Representatives by Vote Share
Osnes  
26 
 
 
Bibliography 
Adler, E. Scott, and John D. Wilkerson. 2012. Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Anderson, William, Janet Box-Steffensmeier, and Valeria Sinclair-Chapman. 2001. “Navigating 
Rough Waters: Modeling Member Effectiveness in the US House of Representatives.” Presented 
at the APSA. 
———. 2003. “The Keys to Legislative Success in the U.S. House of Representatives.” Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 28(3): 357–86. 
Bratton, Kathleen, and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. “Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State 
Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race.” Journal of Politics 61(3): 658–79. 
Cox, Gary W., and William C. Terry. 2008. “Legislative Productivity in the 93rd-105th Congresses.” 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 33(4): 603–18. 
Deering, Christopher J., and Steven S. Smith. 1997. Committees in Congress. Third. Washington 
D.C.: CQ Press. 
Fenno, Richard. 2013. The Challenge of Congressional Representation. Cambridge, London: Harvard 
Universtiy Press. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1989. Congress, Keystone of the Washington Establishment. 2nd ed. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
https://cuvpn.colorado.edu/dana/home/launch.cgi?url=http%3A%2F%2Flibraries.colorado.edu 
(November 17, 2013). 
Frantzich, Stephen. 1979. “Who Makes Our Laws? The Legislative Effectiveness of the U. S. 
Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4(3): 409–28. 
Groseclose, Tim, and Charles Stewart III. 1998. “The Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-
91.” American Journal of Political Science 43(2): 453–74. 
Hasecke, Edward, and Jason Mycoffe. 2007. “Party Loyalty and Legislative Success Are Loyal 
Majority Party Members More Successful in the U.S. House of Representatives?” Political 
Research Quarterly 60(4): 607–17. 
Hibbing, John R. 1991. Congressional Careers. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North 
Carolina Press. 
Jeydel, Alana, and Andrew Taylor. 2013. “Are Women Legislators Less Effective? Evidence from the 
U.S. House in the 103rd-105th Congress.” Political Research Quarterly 56(1): 19–27. 
Krutz, Glen S. 2005. “Issues and Institutions: ‘Winnowing’ in the U.S. Congress.” American Journal 
of Political Science 49(2): 313–26. 
Osnes  
27 
 
Matthews, Donald. 1959. “The Folkways of the United States Senate: Conformity to Group Norms 
and Legislative Effectiveness.” The American Political Science Review 53(4): 1064–89. 
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. Yale University Press. 
https://cuvpn.colorado.edu/dana/home/launch.cgi?url=http%3A%2F%2Flibraries.colorado.edu 
(November 17, 2013). 
———. 1991. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations 1946-1990. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Meye, Katherine. 1980. “Legislative Influence: Toward Theory Development through Causal 
Analysis.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 5(4): 563–85. 
Mouw, Calvin, and Malcom Mackuen. 1992. “The Strategic Agenda in Legislative Politics.” The 
American Political Science Review 86(1): 86–105. 
Richard F. Fenno. 1997. Learning to Govern: An Institutional View of the 104th Congress. Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Squire, Peverill. 1992. “Legislative Professionalism and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures.” 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 17(1): 69–79. 
———. 2007. “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited.” State 
Politics & Policy Quarterly 7(2): 211–27. 
Sue, Thomas. 2005. “Cracking the Glass Ceiling.” In Gender and American Politics: Women, Men, 
and the Poltiical Process, eds. Sue Tolleson-Rinehart and Jyl J. Josephson. New York: Armonk, 
242–63. 
http://encore.colorado.edu/iii/encore/record/C__Rb3744168__S%28Cracking%20the%20glass%
20ceiling%29__Orightresult__X3?lang=eng&suite=cobalt. 
Volden, Craig, and Alan Wiseman. 2009. “Legislative Effectiveness in Congress.” The Ohio State 
University. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.175.9133&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
Volden, Craig, Alan Wiseman, and Dana Wittmer. 2013. “When Are Women More Effective 
Lawmakers Than Men?” American Journal of Political Science 57(2): 26–341. 
